Speculations on a divided Iraq
May. 24th, 2005 07:19 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
tagrynOver at Intel Dump, Phil Carter posted an interesting article where 'experts' on historical insurgencies tried to figure out what the goals of the Iraqi guerillas are. Some concluded that the fighters don't have any anymore, that sheer nihilism is driving them at this point. Others postulated that the goal at this point is to try and spark a civil war, which would leave the Sunni Ba'athists in control of at least part of the country (vs. none of it, which is the prospect at this point). In the course of the comments section, it got me to thinking what a fractured Iraq might look like, if the insurgents somehow got their way. Assuming there's a relatively clean three-way break, instead of a total decent into chaos (which is what a division along tribal lines would look like), here's how it would likely break down:
THE SUNNI TRIANGLE - Including Al-Anbar province, Mosul, Tikrit...basically everything to the west and northwest of Baghdad. Would be ruled by a new Ba'athist 'big man', probably either Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (the "king of clubs" in the Coalition's deck of cards) or one of the former Saddam generals. Would be your basic Ba'athist state, highly oppressive and paranoid, probably even moreso considering the weak state they would find themselves in & the number of enemies they would be facing. Even after managing to collapse the Iraqi elected government, the Saddamites would face the task of trying to defeat the Islamists, their former allies who would be none too happy to see a return of the Ba'athists to power when they were fighting to bring an Islamic state to the area.
SHIA SOUTH - Would control the southern oil fields and the area to the southeast of Baghdad, as well as the Islamic center in Najaf. In a situation where Iraq fragmented, this country would likely be highly dependent on the Iranians through their influence on SCIRI, especially if Grand Ayatollah Sistani were to meet with an "accident" - as would be likely if Iran percieved him as standing in their way. Another internal stress would be whether Muqtada al-Sadr would stay quiet once an independent Shia state was seen as likely, or whether his "Mahdi Army" would reconstitute itself. This state would have the advantage of oil resources, but may find itself hard-pressed to avoid becoming nothing more than a vassal state of Iran.
[UPDATE 1130AM: Something else that occured to me: having a Shia state on their borders would likely give the Saudis some restless nights, what with the way they suppress their Shi'ite minority. Even a Shia-led unified Iraq is probably an unpleasant prospect to them, though not as much as Saddam was. I suspect the Kuwaitis would be unhappy as well, since they probably figured they were going to be relieved of the heavy U.S. military presence in their country once Saddam was toppled, but with the Iranians apparently on the march they'd likely see a need for the U.S. protective presence for years to come.]
KURDISH NORTHEAST - Probably the only one of the three states who would be a U.S. ally and the most stable of the three, but would be surrounded by enemies. The Iranians to the east and (especially) the Turks to the north would be very hostile to seeing an independent Kurdistan carved out of the remnants of Iraq, because of the possibility that it could enflame their own Kurdish minorities to demand independence as well. Turkey could go so far as to send troops down into northern Iraq, as they were hoping to do once Saddam was defeated...which would put the U.S. between a rock and a hard place in terms of having to choose between their Kurdish allies & a NATO member in Turkey. At the same time, the Ba'athists to the west would be enemies, and the Shi'ites to the south would be indifferent neighbors at best.
CONTESTED AREAS: KIRKUK AND BAGHDAD - In the event of an Iraqi meltdown, Kirkuk and Baghdad would be flashpoints. Kirkuk is in the middle of the northern oil fields, and a city which the Kurds very much want as a part of an indepedent Kurdistan. Because of its strategic value, however, both the Sunnis and the Turks have very strong incentives to try and deny Kirkuk to the Kurds. Baghdad is recognized by all as the capital of Iraq, and its central location in the country, large population, and symbolic significance would make it a prize worth fighting for. While it is located within the edge of the Sunni Triangle, the capital has a Shia majority population which would be hostile to being integrated again into a Sunni-dominated nation.
THE SUNNI TRIANGLE - Including Al-Anbar province, Mosul, Tikrit...basically everything to the west and northwest of Baghdad. Would be ruled by a new Ba'athist 'big man', probably either Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (the "king of clubs" in the Coalition's deck of cards) or one of the former Saddam generals. Would be your basic Ba'athist state, highly oppressive and paranoid, probably even moreso considering the weak state they would find themselves in & the number of enemies they would be facing. Even after managing to collapse the Iraqi elected government, the Saddamites would face the task of trying to defeat the Islamists, their former allies who would be none too happy to see a return of the Ba'athists to power when they were fighting to bring an Islamic state to the area.
SHIA SOUTH - Would control the southern oil fields and the area to the southeast of Baghdad, as well as the Islamic center in Najaf. In a situation where Iraq fragmented, this country would likely be highly dependent on the Iranians through their influence on SCIRI, especially if Grand Ayatollah Sistani were to meet with an "accident" - as would be likely if Iran percieved him as standing in their way. Another internal stress would be whether Muqtada al-Sadr would stay quiet once an independent Shia state was seen as likely, or whether his "Mahdi Army" would reconstitute itself. This state would have the advantage of oil resources, but may find itself hard-pressed to avoid becoming nothing more than a vassal state of Iran.
[UPDATE 1130AM: Something else that occured to me: having a Shia state on their borders would likely give the Saudis some restless nights, what with the way they suppress their Shi'ite minority. Even a Shia-led unified Iraq is probably an unpleasant prospect to them, though not as much as Saddam was. I suspect the Kuwaitis would be unhappy as well, since they probably figured they were going to be relieved of the heavy U.S. military presence in their country once Saddam was toppled, but with the Iranians apparently on the march they'd likely see a need for the U.S. protective presence for years to come.]
KURDISH NORTHEAST - Probably the only one of the three states who would be a U.S. ally and the most stable of the three, but would be surrounded by enemies. The Iranians to the east and (especially) the Turks to the north would be very hostile to seeing an independent Kurdistan carved out of the remnants of Iraq, because of the possibility that it could enflame their own Kurdish minorities to demand independence as well. Turkey could go so far as to send troops down into northern Iraq, as they were hoping to do once Saddam was defeated...which would put the U.S. between a rock and a hard place in terms of having to choose between their Kurdish allies & a NATO member in Turkey. At the same time, the Ba'athists to the west would be enemies, and the Shi'ites to the south would be indifferent neighbors at best.
CONTESTED AREAS: KIRKUK AND BAGHDAD - In the event of an Iraqi meltdown, Kirkuk and Baghdad would be flashpoints. Kirkuk is in the middle of the northern oil fields, and a city which the Kurds very much want as a part of an indepedent Kurdistan. Because of its strategic value, however, both the Sunnis and the Turks have very strong incentives to try and deny Kirkuk to the Kurds. Baghdad is recognized by all as the capital of Iraq, and its central location in the country, large population, and symbolic significance would make it a prize worth fighting for. While it is located within the edge of the Sunni Triangle, the capital has a Shia majority population which would be hostile to being integrated again into a Sunni-dominated nation.
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no subject
Date: 2005-05-24 03:31 pm (UTC)Of course, recent reports suggest that Iraqi police are doing plenty on their own to incite civil war; some are suggesting that Iraqi police are raiding Mosques in the search for insurgents. The government maintains that this is the work of the insurgents in police uniforms, but there's no little amount of distrust of the actual police force, and this could very well be the work of rogue units. Gyah, what a mess.
no subject
Date: 2005-05-24 05:16 pm (UTC)- I realize I may be naive for thinking this, but I believe that even if things collapse, the U.S. needs to stand with the Kurds for honor's sake if nothing else. The abandonment of the Shia and the Kurds to Saddam in '91 is one of the reasons so many Iraqis were leery of throwing their support behind the Coalition: "are you going to leave us to them again?" was a common and legit question.
Throwing one of the few genuinely pro-U.S. peoples in the region to the lions for the sake of maintaining harmony with the Turks and Arabs would be cold-bloodedly evil. Stupid as well, but mainly evil.
- Another thing which will be interesting to see how it resolves itself is the reconstitution of the Iraqi intelligence community. According to this story, the CIA is refusing to give up control of the current intel service to the incoming Iraqi government, supposedly because they don't want the SCIRI elements in the new gov't to hand over what the CIA knows about Iranian involvement in Iraq to their sponsors in Iran.